The military plays a crucial role in furthering or hindering democratization in Africa. Beyond direct intervention through coups, armies more subtly and perniciously condition the political trajectory of states through their loyalty. Leaders who can rely on unwavering military support for protection against internal unrest face fewer risks and greater chances of success in rolling back liberalization and entrenching authoritarian practices. Constructing ethnic armies, which tie the fate of soldiers to the regime, is a profoundly powerful way to affect such loyalty. Through a mixed methods analysis of presidential bids to challenge term limits, including a paired comparison of Senegal and Cameroon, I demonstrate that ethnic armies triple the chances of success and, in so doing, encourage defiance in the first place: 82% of presidents back by ethnic armies attempt to defy their constitutions and extend their hold on power, as opposed to 31% of other leaders. Conversely, ethnically diverse armies are far more likely to defend constitutional politics and constrain leaders to abide by term limits. The ethnic composition of the military thus critically shapes the prospects for African liberalization. 
question of how African democracy can be deepened, and authoritarian regression prevented, remains vital. This article will argue that the military plays a crucial and under-studied role in promoting or hindering liberalization in Africa. Soldiers can and do seize power, directly undermining constitutional politics and threatening a return to military governance. But militaries also play a much more subtle and perhaps pernicious role in undermining democratization. Leaders rely on their militaries for protection against both internal and external threats. Where military loyalty is ensured through personal or ethnic bonds, presidents can discount domestic challenges to their rule, untying their hands to pursue authoritarian practices.
Through an analysis of presidential bids to defy term limits, I show that leaders who can count on the aid of a coethnic army are both more likely to challenge term limits and more successful in so doing. More optimistically, ethnically diverse armies seem far more likely to defend constitutional politics and constrain leaders to abide by term limits. With only two exceptions, leaders who challenged their term limits without benefiting from an ethnically loyal army, failed in those bids. The ethnic composition of the military thus critically shapes the prospects for African liberalization.
This argument contributes to a small but growing literature on the role of the military in democratization processes. Extant work has focused predominantly on direct military intervention, in the form of coups d'état. Collier, for example, has opined that military coups 5 are the only realistic way to remove highly repressive and long ruling dictators. Taking up this 6 argument, Thyne and Powell find that coups promote democratization in contexts where it is least likely to occur otherwise, in highly authoritarian states with long-standing rulers. 7 ! 2 Additionally, Miller argues that irregular transfers of power, mostly constituted by coups, lead to democratization when unseating economically developed autocracies, while Marinov and Goemans find that coups lead to democratization conditional on high levels of western aid. 8 Gürsoy argues that even failed coup plots can facilitate democratization where their aftermaths encourage soldiers to accept civilian rule. 9 Others, however, have argued that coups undermine democracy. Tusalem analyzes countries transitioning to democracy and finds that the higher the degree of military politicization and past coup interventionism, the more deleterious the effect on democratic consolidation. Harkness argues that democratization threatens previously ethnically stacked 10 militaries, who now face a severe threat to their privileged position within the state and access to an important source of patronage. To protect their benefits, such ethnic armies intervene and block democratization or reverse the outcomes of elections. 11 While acknowledging that coups matter, this article transcends this prior focus, demonstrating that militaries need not seize the reigns of government themselves to powerfully impact the democratization of the state. Their loyalty matters, whether to a coethnic president or to the constitution, and can make the difference between further liberalization and the return of authoritarianism.
Challenging Term Limits
Nullifying term limits has emerged as one of the primary means through which African presidents consolidate their power and shift back towards authoritarianism. Term limits are 12 considered by many to provide a vital check on executive power and enable deepening ! 3 democratization. They increase the transparency and fairness of elections, facilitate alternations in governing political parties, build trust in democratic institutions, and create a focal point around which citizens, opposition parties, and NGOs can mobilize to defend constitutionalism. 13 By legally nullifying or otherwise ignoring term limits, African presidents not only sacrifice these democratic gains but also undermine the key mechanism for their removal, extending their tenure indefinitely and allowing further abuses of power. Moreover, they do so through quasiacceptable legal maneuvering, allowing pseudo-democratic but presidentially controlled legislatures, judiciaries, and popular referenda do their dirty work for them, rather than resorting to more overt and costly forms of violence that would trigger international condemnation and the suspension of aid flows. Recent culprits span the continent, encompassing leaders from 18 different countries (see Table 1 ).
[ Table 1 about here ] 14 Yet, not all presidents choose to challenge limits to their rule. Almost half accept their term limits gracefully. Moreover, not all bids to ignore term limits or amend constitutions to nullify them succeed: nearly 40% fail. Such variation raises important, interrelated empirical questions as to which factors shape the strategic decision to resist term limits and what then conditions success. In a preliminary effort to answer the first of these questions, Posner and Young find that presidential age, margin of victory in past elections, foreign aid dependence, oil wealth, and prior acceptance of term limits influence whether a leader challenges term limits. 15 What is so far missing from the analysis, as the following vignettes will show, is the potential role of the military in shaping these decisions and their outcomes.
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In April 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza announced his intention to run for a third term in office, violating both the constitution and the Arusha peace accords that had ended Burundi's devastating civil war. Nkurunziza had already shown a tendency towards deepening autocratic practices such as censoring the media, engaging in electoral fraud, and threatening violence against NGOs and human rights activists. After his announcement, thousands of protestors filled the streets and were met with brutality. Police were authorized to fire indiscriminately into the crowds; the ruling party's youth militia were mobilized to beat and repress protestors; and neighborhoods thought to harbor dissenters were subjected to mass arrests and house-to-house searches. As the streets degenerated into violence, a faction of the military stepped in and attempted to seize power. Overpowered by loyal elements of the army, they failed. 16 The coup attempt only succeeded in furthering Nkurunziza's resolve to cling to power. The regime cracked down on suspected opponents, inside and outside the military. Brutality against protestors intensified with escalating abuses by the police, intelligence services, and militias. Dead bodies became a common sight in the streets of the capital, with upwards of 400 estimated fatalities by the end of the year. Within the military, although the coup attempt was led by a coethnic Hutu General, Nkurunziza conflated Tutsi soldiers with the threat to his government: arresting, assassinating, and rotating them to remote posts. Officers and rank-andfile soldiers alike have defected to emerging rebel groups, which have begun conducting attacks.
Having embraced authoritarianism, Burundi now teeters on the brink of renewed civil war. 17 On the other side of the continent, in Burkina Faso, a similar attempt to defy term limits led to a very different outcome. Although President Blaise Compaoré rose to power through a ! 5 military coup in 1987, he had presided over the slow liberalization of the state and the adoption of a democratic constitution. In 2014, when he attempted to defy the term limits he had helped to create, bitter disagreements broke out with the opposition political parties and mass demonstrations turned nearly a million people onto the streets (in a country of only 17 million).
As the regime turned increasingly to violence, Burkina Faso's military intervened and successfully took over the government. Within months, the constitution had been restored and a transitional civilian president elected by a special college of military, political, religious, and traditional leaders. Despite a failed counter-coup by Compaoré's elite presidential guard, democratic elections were held on November 29, 2015-marking the first time that elections had ever brought a new President to power in Burkina Faso. Compaoré's attempt to defy term limits thus counterintuitively resulted in a new opportunity for further liberalization and democratic consolidation. 18 What both of these anecdotes suggest is that military loyalty may be critical to presidential survival when authoritarian tendencies encounter heavy resistance. Loyal units in Burundi's army ensured that Nkurunziza stayed in power and that his bid to defy term limits succeeded. Burkina Faso's constitutionally loyal military factions, on the other hand, prevailed over Compaoré's personally loyal presidential guard, resulting in his fall from power and a democratic reopening of the government. The following section develops a theoretical framework of how military loyalty-specifically ethnically-based loyalty-shapes whether presidential attempts to challenge term limits will succeed and, hence, whether leaders will strategically choose to risk such action in the first place.
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Theoretical Framework: Military Loyalty and Presidential Bids to Defy Term Limits
Reasserting authoritarianism runs the risk of provoking mass dissent. In the face of either violent challenges or civil resistance campaigns, leaders must rely on their security forces to protect their hold on power. Beyond stabilizing the regime against serious opposition, loyal soldiers also facilitate preemptive repression and thereby deter challenges, diminishing the likelihood that such opposition emerges in the first place. One prominent historic source of reliable military loyalty in Africa has been the construction of coethnic armies, which tie soldiers to the fate of their leader through ethnically exclusive recruitment and patronage practices.
Unwavering military loyalty, created through shared ethnic ties, enables leaders to successfully rollback democratic gains, increasing the probability that they strategically seek to do so.
Challenging term limits is risky business. Afrobarometer data indicate that the majority of citizens in every single country surveyed support a limit of two terms for the presidency. Given the importance of military loyalty to autocratic stability, it should come as no surprise that leaders with authoritarian tendencies have developed many mechanisms for trying ! 8 to guarantee that loyalty. Paramilitaries and presidential guards, personally loyal to the president and outside the normal chain of command, have been created. Expensive equipment, pay 26 raises, and private enrichment opportunities have all been granted to "buy off" the military. 27 And recruitment, promotion, and retention practices have been built around shared kinship or ethnicity. 28 While each of these mechanisms may enhance military loyalty in times of trouble, I focus on ethnic armies for two reasons. First, constructing military loyalty on ethnic foundations has been an historically widespread practice in Africa. Colonial African militaries were officered almost exclusively by white Europeans drawn from the metropole, while their rank-and-file soldiers were recruited from "martial races" deemed to be more politically reliable and fitted to military duties. Facing a precarious regional security environment, replete with threats of state 29 failure, coups, and civil war, many independence era leaders looked to this model and built their armies on the basis of shared identity. Over half of Africa's postcolonial armies were stacked with the leaders' coethnics, creating an abiding legacy of ethnic armies across the continent. 30 Second, shared ethnicity provides a particularly enduring and rigorous basis for military loyalty. Conditioning recruitment, retention, and promotion on shared identity within an important state institution reinforces the centrality of ethnicity within the political system and in the eyes of individuals. Soldiers thus become ever more likely to perceive that their privileges 31 and benefits are tied directly to their identity and, moreover, to a coethnic regime retaining power. If another group took over, or even an ethnically diverse or neutral government, then their access to a prime source of patronage and security would be forfeited. The ethnic army's fate ! 9 thus becomes bound with that of their leader. This makes them particularly predisposed to act in a unified manner and defend the current government at all costs.
We expect ethnic armies to remain loyal to their leaders and to support their bids to rollback liberalization and consolidate autocratic power, even in the face of mass dissent. Ethnic armies thus enable presidents to defy term limits and, by facilitating success, encourage the attempt.
Research Design
The remainder of this article employs a multi-method research design to test the argument that ethnic armies increase both the probability that leaders will attempt to nullify constitutional term limits and that they will be successful in so doing. First, cross-national descriptive statistics
and bivariate logit models demonstrate general patterns. Due to the small universe of cases, regression analysis is inapplicable: as of 2016, only 37 African presidents had reached their constitutional two-term limit and, of these, 18 attempted to alter or ignore the constitution. There are important contextual differences between the cases that should be acknowledged. While Senegal has very few mineral resources and an agriculturally-based export sector dominated by peanuts, Cameroon has been an oil producer since independence. Oil rents may constitute a political resource curse predisposing Cameroon to more authoritarian governance. Senegal also benefits from a longer history of quasi-democratic institutions. Under 32 colonial rule, the four urban communes of Senegal were granted limited self-governance and political representation, both locally and within metropolitan France. Both of these factors could contribute to greater democratic prospects in Senegal. Both are, however, background conditions and I will argue that the more proximal factor of military loyalty played a direct role in conditioning the outcome of each president's challenge to term limits.
Cross-National Analysis
Cross-national data on all African presidents that reached their two term limit, whether they challenged those limits, and whether they succeeded was obtained from Posner and Leaders who benefitted from the backing of an ethnically loyal military were significantly more likely to challenge their term limits. Presidents who had constructed coethnic security institutions account for over half the total number of such challenges and the bivariate relationship is statistically significant (see Table 2 ). While 31% of leaders without an ethnic army did attempt to ignore or alter their constitutions, a non-trivial rate of defiance, a remarkable 82% of presidents backed by an ethnic army took up the same mantle. Indeed, in only one country did prior ethnic stacking not lead to term limit challenges: both Presidents Moi (2002) and Kibaki (2012) respected Kenya's two-term limit despite having disproportionately recruited Kalenjin and Kikuyu, respectively, into the higher echelons of the officer corps. Apart from 36 apparent Kenyan exceptionalism, ethnic armies strongly encourage leaders to defy their constitutions.
[ Table 2 about here]
This relationship seems to hold when considering other theoretically relevant variables.
In their analysis, Posner and Young find that both oil production and prior respect for term limits meaningfully shape whether a leader seeks to unconstitutionally extend their time in office. Oil revenues make leaders less dependent on both external aid and domestic taxes, potentially undermining sources of pressure to respect the constitution. A precedent of abiding by term limits, on the other hand, may entrench democratic norms and encourage future leaders to do the same. Other variables they consider-including the president's age, vote share and victory margin in the prior election, and foreign aid-were not significant, even in bivariate comparisons between sample means. 37 Table 3 presents a bivariate coefficient matrix for the three most theoretically relevant independent variables and the dependent variable. An ethnic army and oil wealth are both positively correlated with term limit defiance while a precedent of observing term limits is negatively correlated with future challenges. None of the independent variables are correlated with each other, however, in a statistically significant manner. While only suggestive, this series of bivariate results indicates that the effect of an ethnic army is not merely reducible to another variable. Unfortunately, the dataset is too small to conduct regression analysis, even between a limited number of variables, and is certainly too small to include interaction terms or a full set of controls.
[ Table 3 about here]
In addition to influencing which presidents seek to defy their term limits, ethnic armies enhance their chances of success (see Table 4 ). With the exception of Malawi's Muluzi, every leader backed by coethnic security institutions who tried was able to alter or ignore their constitution and embark on a third term in office. In contrast, leaders without an ethnic army failed to extend their tenure 75% of the time. This relationship is strong and statistically significant: a coethnic army more than triples the predicted probability, from roughly 28% to 85%, of a president successfully defying his term limits.
Closer analysis of the two exceptions, where presidents succeeded despite commanding diverse militaries, lends further support to the theorized mechanism. First, President Nkurunziza of Burundi attempted to defy his term limits against the back drop of a diverse military created through a peace agreement, integrating the state's former Tutsi dominated army with Hutu rebel soldiers. As previously discussed, Nkurunziza miscalculated his military's loyalty and a faction of it attempted to overthrow him. He thus prevailed in extending his rule against long odds that probably should have deterred him from seeking a third term in the first place. Indeed, overt interventions by at least some part of the armed forces to prevent a leader from defying the constitution only occurred where militaries had not been previously ethnically stacked: in Burkina Faso, Burundi, and Niger (emphasized in bold in Table 4 ).
Second, President Sam Nujoma was able to alter Namibia's constitution and successfully run for a third term in 1999. Like Nkurunziza, Nujoma also commanded a diverse national military created in the aftermath of war by integrating the victorious, and largely Ovambo, rebel army with the ethnic battalions of the South African-backed territorial military. Despite not 38 benefitting from an ethnically loyal army, he was nonetheless able to count on deep and abiding ! 14 military loyalty. Nujoma was a war hero and a lauded figure in Namibia's struggle for independence against apartheid South Africa. He thus enjoyed high levels of personal legitimacy and loyalty both within Namibia's military and across society; loyalty he could rely on in the unlikely event that opposition emerged to his further rule.
Existing alternative theories do not seem to carry much explanatory value. Unlike military loyalty, mass mobilization does not systematically influence whether term limit challenges are successful, as Yarwood has suggested. While widespread protests have been 39 significant in cases like Burkina Faso and Senegal, they have been equally insignificant in contexts such as Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville. Indeed, of the cases in which mass mobilization arose, presidents still successfully defied term limits exactly half of the time, producing a statistically insignificant and substantively meaningless correlation (see Table A2 The cross-national data thus lend compelling support to the theory developed: coethnic armies greatly increase the probability that a leader can defy their term limits and extend their hold on power, encouraging those leaders to make the attempt.
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Paired Case Comparison: Cameroon and Senegal
Cameroon and Senegal are broadly comparable cases of patronage-based authoritarian regimes that both faced intense liberalization pressures in the 1990's, leading to competitive multiparty elections. They have since followed divergent trajectories with Senegal embarking on a path of increasing democratization, especially following Wade's failed bid to defy constitutional term limits. Cameroon, by contrast, has remained stubbornly autocratic under long-ruling President Biya, who has successfully nullified any restrictions to indefinitely seeking reelection. A critical factor underlying these different paths has been the degree to which each leader could rely on the unwavering loyalty of their security institutions to repress dissent. Biya has routinely employed his coethnic army to dampen opposition and maintain his hold on power, Of course, it is those leaders reliant on ethnic loyalty to sustain their power who are least likely to initiate reforms. Even where there is the political will for military restructuring, meritbased reform is no easy task and will likely inspire resistance from officers whose privileged position is now threatened. Both difficult to dislodge and directly enabling presidential consolidation of power, ethnic armies may thus directly contribute to the already noted divergent trajectories of African states: those experiencing virtuous cycle of liberalization and good governance versus those that have fallen into a vicious cycle of deepening authoritarianism.
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